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We study the problem of appropriately generating connectives (e.g., 'but', 'because', 'since', 'however') in a 
discourse. We claim that connectives operate at the discourse level rather than the semantic level, and that they indicate 
pragm.atic features of the units they connecL Therefore, in order to choose the appropriate connective, a surface 
generator must find in its input a set of pragmatic features that affect or are affected by the choice of a connective. We 
present such a set of features and show their role in a variety of examples of the connective 'but'. 
Topic Areas: Language generation, discourse structure, pragmatics 
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1. The problem: generating pragmatic connectives in the stream of conversation 
In order to express how their conttibution fits into the stream of conversation, people often choose a pragmatic 
connector (such as 'but', 'although', 'since' or 'because') to link their turn to preceding turns. This class of words has 
been called 'discourse words' [Ducrot et aI 80]. We claim that discourse words do not operate at the level of the 
truth-conditions of the units they connect, but at the level of discursive activity: they indicate how to interpret and relate 
a tum to previous Cl" implicit ones, rather than indicating a logical connection between the contents of these units. The 
role of discourse words - or clue words - as discourse structure markers has been acknowledged in previous work (see 
[Reichman 85, Flowers et aI 82, Cohen 87, Grosz & Sidner 86, Hirschberg & Liunan 87]). We go further in this 
direction: connectives not only mark segment boWldaries in discourse, they also identify and determine cenain 
semantico-pragmatic features of the units they join and these indirectly constrain their surface linguistic structure. 
The word 'but' is taken as an example throughout the paper. Our approach allows a unified description of the usage 
of 'but' in various situations. Not only does our description indicate that 'but' marks a discourse segment boundary, but 
it also identifies the features of the connected units that are affected by the presence of a 'but'. 
More generally, we infer from the pragmatic nature of discourse words one crucial specification on the design of a 
surface generator able to pnxluce such connectives: the input to such a system must contain more than just the logical 
content of the previous turns and of the tum to be generated. Since turns in a conversation are not linked by content 
only, the generator1 must be provided with other features of the turns in order to adequately choose the proper 
connective, and adapt the surface Coon of the conjoints to this choice. What features are needed then, and how can they 
be used to generate an appropriate surface form? We present here a set of such features that allow selection of 
connectives for a variety of situations. We call the structure formed by these features an interpretative format for 
reasons that will be discussed soon. The choice of these Ceatures is based on the semantic theory of Ducrot [DucrOl 
83, List 84] and on the pragmatic theory of Roulet [Rouiet et aI 85], as well as on our own analysis of naturally 
occurring examples. 
2. Argumentative orientation and Topoi 
(1) I want to buy it, but it is expensive. 
The classical deftnition of 'but' indicales that. the complex 'p bUi q' expresses an opposition between p and q as 
illustrated in example (I), . A fonnalization of this definition in logical tenns would state the equivalence: 
p but q <--> (p and q) and opposition (p,q) 
But consider now abe following example: 
(2) : A: It'. beautiful 
I: ~ it'. expensive. 
Whatever representation is chosen to specify the semantics of the predica1e oppositicn, it seems unlilce1y one would 
maintain that A and B in (2) can be in opposition. F<r it is well accepted in our society that beauty deserves a high price. 
1 In this paper, we use ',CIleraiOr' to refer 10 • rurflCe a-naar thIl blilda JYIIl.ICtic: lUUaute and makr:t 1exical c:boices. Note that ullimal.el~ 
some compaleDl eX aliDguaae ~ synem must be retpeXI.ibJe fer idenufyina pBgmatiA; featureJ. We don'l ~. in thiJ paper ho .... 'Uell 
identific:.auoo would be done IIld how it would intenct with the acUODJ of. IUrf&c:e 'CIl~. 
and we can reasonably accept the statement: 
beautiful (x) --> expensive(x) 
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This implication would tend to show that A and B are more in 'agreement' than in ·opposition'. 
Similarly, [Quirk et aJ 72] propose that 'p but q' expresses the surprise of a locutor that q is true in view of p. Here 
again, aside from the fuziness of the notion 'surprise', it is difficult to believe that B can be surprised by the 
expensiveness of an object given its beauty. 
A computational account of clue words in argumentative discourses [Cohen 87] also has problems. Cohen presents 
a classification of clue words (derived from [Quirk et al 72]) related to an algorithmic model of argument 
understanding. In this model, arguments are logical propositions forming a tree. In such a tree, the root is a claim 
whereas the leaves provide tvUknces for their parent node. The role of connectives is to indicate how a proposition is 
related to the previous nodes - that is, where it fits in the tree. In this account, a construction P bUi Q would indicate that 
Q is either a child or a sibling of P - that is, that Q is either evidence for P, or Q and P are both evidence for a common 
proposition R. Cohen uses the same device to represent both evidence and counter-evidence. Consequently, there is no 
way to distinguish between refomwlalivt connectives (e.g., 'in other words' or 'namely') and contrastive connectives 
(e.g., 'but', 'however'): both are represented by a parent/child relation. There is even less of a mechanism to distinguish 
between two contrastive connectives, like 'although' and 'but'. The structural indication given by 'but' is a worthy 
indication, but it is far from being a description of the meaning of 'but' and does not help in explaining example (2). 
More satisfying for analyzing example (2) is the description of 'but' given in (Ducrot et al 80]. In p but q, p is 
presented as an argument for a certain conclusion r, and q as an argument for the opposite conclusion oot(r). The 
interpretation of p bUi q requires the instantiation of what Ducrot calls the argumentative variable r. 
In our example, such a conclusion could be: 
A: It's beautiful [--> I want to buy it) 
B: But it's expensive [--> you don't want to buy it). 
The opposition between A and B is in this perspective indirect and requires the identification of an implicit 
conclusioo. To describe this identification process. [Anscombre &: Ducrot 83] hypothesize a set of very particular 
principles that they call topoi. Topoi are gradual inference rules of the form "the more/less:c is P, the morelless y is Q". 
x and y being arbitrary objects and P and Q gradual properties. 
In example (2), die topoi supporting abe interpreWioo we have proposed would be: 
(Tl) The more an object is beautiful, the more a person wants to buy it. 
(T2) The more an object is expensive, the less a person wants to buy it. 
What are the conclusions we can draw from this analysis? B's reply in (2) is not linked to the content of A's flfS{ 
turn, but to an interJretation of this tum that hypothesizes an argwnenwive ooentation in it. and that is based on .i 
particular topos. To explain the choice of 'but' in this case, we need to refer to the propositions (r and OOl(r» presented 
as a conclusion of each of the turns (we call this conclusion the argumentative orientation of an unera.nce) and to lhc 
topoi relating these conclusions to an aspect of the logical content of the turns. 
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The important characteristic of these features is that they are not part of the semantics of the sentences we consider. 
They are part of the interpretation of the utterances in a given situation by a given locuur that justifies the use of a 
'but' in his sentence. Fran a generation perspective, it means that the argumentative reatures or the turn we want to 
generate must be part of the input to a surface generator. 
We propose an infonnal description of 'but' based on a slight modification of the one proposed in [Ducrot er aI 80]. 
'But' is the marker of the following interpretative move between two locutors A and B: A says p, B replies: "you 
pretend to conclude r through p, but you cannot because q, therefore not(r),,2. But in order to account for the incredible 
versatility of 'but' attested in transcripts of real conversations, we need to add some flexibility to this description. We 
need to determine not only the conclusion r left implicit in the move, but also the features of p and q that are at the 
source of the move. And much of the fleXibility of 'but' comes from the large choice available here. We extend 
Ducrot's model by proposing a fonnal description of the features of p and q that are relevant for the choice of a 
connective. 
3. What is the theme of a tum? 
(3) A: Can you close the door? 
B: ~ I'm not your slave! 
If we want to apply the argumentative description of 'but' to example (3) we must come up with a conclusion r of 
the type " A has authority over B". The whole interpretation w~uld be: 
A: I order you to close the door (--> I have authority over you] 
B: ~ I'm not your slave (--> you have no authority over me] 
Using the topoi: 
Tl: The more X gives orders to Y, the more X has authority over Y 
T2: The more X is the slave of Y, the more Y has authority over X 
When we look for a conclusion r to instantiate the model 'p but q', we actually look fa a topoi having r as a 
conclusion and a thematic pl~ty of p as a premise. The problem with example (3) is that A did not talk about the act 
of ordering and yet this is the theme B chose to elaborale on. So wlw can function as the theme3 of a tum, and how can 
we access it? In (2), the theme of p was the expensiveness of the object· that is. a property mentioned in the 
propositional content of p. Here the theme is a property of the speech act achieved by p. 
If we represent the act reaI.i.zed by an uuuance as IF(pc) . wh~ IF is an illocutionary force and PC a propositional 
content (see [Searle Ii: Vanda'veken 85]) • then the theme of an utterance can be derived either from IF or from PC. It 
is, however. a <iistincU'Ie popeit)' of 'but' to allow a linking on IF. Other connectives require the linking to be made on 
PC only (e.g.,'althouP°). 
(3) shows thallhe theme is not a property of the semantic content of a tum (pC) , but a pragmatic featrne. It is 
something that needs to be extracted from the linguistic form during interpretation. We have used two procedures of 
lhematiUJlion so far (see (Moeschler 86. Auchlin 86]): the thematization of a speech act in (3). and the argumentative 
lour canpler.e model ~u for the po&libilliy ~ me 10CUI0f' ua.eriIll 'p I:u q' II ance by the notioo of polyphmy introduced in [Ducrot 83\ 
3 we use here the !.erm • theme' in III infonnal .... y that doeI DOt COl respond 10 the !.edmicaJ oppositiOll • themeJrbeme' • 
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analysis in (2).The recovery of the theme is done undez constraints, where the use of connectives such as 'but' is one 
such constraint Our introduction of thematization procedures into the model allows for great flexibility in what can 
function as theme. It means that a proposition p can be interpreted differently in different situations allowing for a 
variety of themes to be produced. 
We draw two conclusions from this analysis: the theme is a pragmatic feature of the turns, and needs to be part of 
the input to a generator. For a generaur, our introduction of thematization procedures allows the production of implicit 
themes. 
4. Functional status of turns in a conversation 
Let us now consider the following example, taken from a transcript of a naturally occuring conversation. recorded 
during an experiment we organized. 'The participants were asked to cooperatively build a crane using a toy construction 
set and provided with separate instructions. 
(4) YI: I have a description on the back of my instruction 
set with the numbers 12 and 21 in circles. 
Do both of you have the same numbers? 
VV2: Yes. the numbers are on the back. but there 
are pictures of the crane on mine. 
Y3: I also have pictures. I was just wondering if we 
got different things. 
We proppse here an interpretation of W2. We are aware that many other intezpretations would be possible given 
this fragment We are not in quest of the "real meaning" of W2. We simply show how our model would allow for this 
possible interpretation. To interpret W2. we need to find how the first segment "Yes, the nwnbers are on the back" is 
linked to its preceeding tum, YI. On the surface YI is a question that can be interpreted in at least the two following 
ways: 
• YI·I: A request for infonnation: Y does not know, and wants to know whether the othez players have the 
same nwnbers on the same page. 
• YI·2: A request for identification: Y is looking at a sheet of his instruction set and wants the others to 
identify the same sheet before asking them to do sanething with this sheet 
The answer Y3 indicates thal Y undersIands that W has chosen the second intezpretation (identification) over the 
nrst (information, that Y actually intended). What role could 'but' have played in Y's interpreWion of W2? 
In order to analyze this eumple. we follow [Rou.Iet el aJ 85] in distinguishing between directiw! and subordinau 
speech acts in a conwa.aw. Intuitively. among the many speech acts accomplished in a turn, the directive act is the 
point of the tum • the ~ why the locutor started talking. The other acts are subordinate to this directive act and 
support it in some way (e., .• IL1 a preparation f<X' it or as a justiftcation) Using this notion. it is possible to nnd a 
distinction between the two possible inteqrewions of YI: YI·I, a request for infonnation, is a directive act, whereas 
YI·2, a request for identification. is a subordinate act YI·I stands for itself· Y wants to know, that's it . whereas Y 1·2 
is a preparation for an expected coming acL 
We introduce a new aspect to our description of 'but': in a segment 'p but q', p has a subordinate status, and q " 
directive. Now, the ftrSt segment of W2 is an answer to YI, as is marked by the "yes". It also has subordinate stalus h .. 
o· 
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our definition of 'but'. This means that W considers the question as a subordinate acr4. From y's perspective, as he 
meant the question simply as a request for infonnation (y 1-1, a <lirective act), the answer p but q is simply inappropriate 
here. 
What conclusions can be drawn from this example? We have implicitly adopted here one of Roulel's assumptions: 
the interpretation of a linguistic segment depends on its position in a larger discourse. To account for that context 
dependency, [Roulet et al 85] propose a hierarchical model of discourse structure. In this model, each unit is made up of 
lower level units. Within a complex unit, constituents are attributed afunctional status. Among the acts fonning a unit, 
one is distinguished and called the directive act. The other constituents are called subordinate. The criterion to 
distinguish the directive act is that it cannot be suppressed from the unit without changing its interpretation. Subordinate 
acts in contrast are 'optional', and can be removed without changing the interpretation of the whole segmen~. The 
directive or subordinate character of a tum must be part of the description of a conversation. From our generation 
perspective, it means the input to a generator must contain an indication of the fwlctional status of the turns to be 
produced. 
5. Re-interpretation 
Example {5}: Mr. Meteo 
In a newspaper, the weather forecast starts with a long paragraph 
on techniques to choose sex of children. The last sentence is: 
We will all end up gays, Women's Lib will die from extinction, 
hey! it's worth it! 
~, for the weather, it is not worth much. 
[Example taken from [Roulet eta! 85)) 
The 'but' here is problematic.6 None of the thematization procedures presented so far can reconcile the content of 
the ftrst paragraph and a statement about the weather. No ~ seems accessible from the two themes presented. The 
speech acts do not provide any further help. However, one way to reach an interpretation for this 'but' is the following: 
First paragraph: the theme is "techniques to choose sex of children." 
Last sentence is the conclusion of the paragraph. It produces 
the interpretation "the article is finished". 
BOT links on this interpretation: 
"you think the article is finished, but the real article 
is just starting now, and the real theme is the weather". 
Here the link we can make between 'but' and the text preceeding it is again indirect: we don't link on the content of 
the paragraph, nor on an implicit conclusion reachable from this content, nor on the speech act realized in the ftrs( 
paragraph. We link OIl me fact thai a first paragraph has been produced and has been intezpreted. This potential 
interpretation is taken _me p needed in our description of 'but'. 
What actually are !be feab1reS of the interpreWion that are used in this example? The functional status of the un Its 
plays an important role: the first paragraph has all the characteristics of a directive unit When 'but' is interpreted. 
"The relation between the swus of the queaiOll IDd !be swus oi !he IDJWI!:r iJ I1Udi.cd in IllOft depIh in oar complete modd. 
sne notioo of prqDWic rubordinaIiOll em be marked in surface (for a.ampie by • tq <pJU1ioa), but it iJ not dlredly rel&led 10 synUct" 
!ubordinaioa 
6 
however. the status of the first paragraph is modified. It becomes a preparation. or an introduction to the real directive 
unit of the whole article. The 'but' constrains the interpretation of the ftrst segment in a powerful manner. it forces the 
reader to consider it as a subordinate wllL The indications given by the 'but' are strong enough to overrule the 
conclusions of a first inlelJretation. Following [Roulet et aI 85]. we call this kind of move re-interpretation. We define 
a re-interpretation as an operation which takes as input a previous interpretation. This interpretation includes the 
specification of the pragmatic features described in this paper: argumentative orientation. functional status, 
illocutionary force or theme. A re-interpretative move makes one of these specifications the theme of the discourse and 
assigns it a new value. In the full paper, we will present a formal mechanism, called stTategic/onnaJ, to account for this 
example more completely. 
We have seen two examples of re-interpretation: in (4), Y3 re-interprets the illocutionary fexee of Yl; in (5), the 
'but' re-interprets the fimctional status of the first pargraph. We can see re-interpretation as a new type of thematization 
procedure: it takes the interpretation of a tum as the theme in a connection. 
6. Interpretative Formats: an input for a generator. 
In the preceding sections, we have analysed five examples and presented different features of the interpretation 
process. We now present a fonnalism that synthesizes the obsezvations made so far. 
We represent an interpretation as a complex description fonned of the following features: 
I(s) - [ utterer (0) 
link between locutor and utterer (LO) 
propositional content (PC) 
illocutionary force (IF) 
theme (Th) 
thematization procedure (ThP) 
argumentative orientation (AO) 
discourse law supporting the interpretation (OL) 
functional status (FS») 
We call such a structure an inurpretanye/ormaJ. We define its features, most of which have been presented in the 
preceding sections, as follows: 
• The Wlerer of a tum is an abstract entity related to but distinct from the locutor. The two flI"St features. U 
and LU. account for an important aspect of language use (polyphony as presented in (Ducrot 83]) but are 
not presented in this paper. 
• The propositional COI'IU1Il of. tum is the notion used in the theory of speech acts ( [Searle & Vanderveken 
85]). We are not commiaed It this point to any panicular representation. whether a predicate-argument 
structure or netMldt·tike ieplcsenratioos. 
• The iJ/oc~foru is the final speech act derived from the sentence. It includes any derivation from a 
surface speech let to an indirect one. F<lr example. for an utterance of "can you close the door?" the value 
of this feature wiD ofttD be imperadw 
• The theme is a set of discursive objects. Discursive objects can be any of the objects, properties or relations 
denoted by the propoIitional content, or, as we have seen in the examples. a property derived from the 
argumentative. illocutionary or functional specifications of an un.erance. We currently represent the theme 
as a flat set, but plan on having a hierarchy of themes re~nting the focusing structure of the utterance. 
• 'The lhemaliuuion procedwe ind.ica1es how the theme has been promoted to the status of theme. We have 
inventoried four types of proc:atures so far: 
• Propositional content: this is the 'normal' situation. where the theme is chosen from the content of 
the sentence as in example (1). 
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• Argumentative derivation: (cf example (2». The theme common to the two conjoints of the 'bUl' is 
argumentatively derived from the propositional content 
• Illocutionary thematization: (cf example (4», The speech act realized in an utterance becomes the 
theme of the connection. 
• Re-interpret.ation: (cf example (5». One of the interpretative specifications of a previous utterance 
becomes the theme of the connection. 
• The argumentative orientarion of an utterance is the conclusion that it implies. It has the foUowing fonnat: 
01 bas degree 5 OD the scale cr. where 0i is a discursive object from the theme and cr an argumentative 
scale. Each scale is quantified in specific gradations, determining the possible values of 5. For example, the 
scale "heat" has degrees (icy. cold, lukewarm. warm, hot). 
• The discourse law is a topos. explaining the derivation of the argumentative orientation. We represent topoi 
as pairs of scales with a sign indicating their polarity: (+/- cr1, +/42). 
• The fUllctional status indicates whether the utterance has a directive or subordinate role in the discourse. 
We represent a connector like 'but' as a relarion between interpretative fOrmalS. Therefcre, in order to produce a 
'but', a generator is provided with a set of interpretative fonnats as input If these fonnats satisfy the relation. a 'but' 
can be produced. Similarly other connectives can be selected. The description of 'but' is a set of constraints on two 
interpretative fonnats P and Q. It specifies that: 
• the two utterers of P and Q must be distinct7• 
• the intersection of the themes of P and Q must be non-empty. 
• Any kind of thematization procedure can be used for both P and Q. 
• The argumentative orientations of P and Q must be on the same scale. and P must have a lesser degree than 
Q. P.AO = (0. 51. cr) and Q.AO = (0, 02. cr) and 51 <002 and 0 is an element of the intersection of the 
themes of P and Q. 
• The topoi used for P and Q must have their right-hand sides of different polarities: if P.DL = ( .... +CJ) then 
Q.DL = ( .... -cr) and vice-versa. 
• P must have a subordinate stalUS and Q a directive sta1US. 
7. Related work 
Our approach to connectives is original in its focus on linguistic (surface) effects. Previous work has been more 
concerned with the study of structure (if [Cohen 87, Flowers et oJ 82. Grosz & Sidner 86. Hirschberg & Litman 87]). 
As noted earlier, Cohen's wtrt deals with connectives only as structural markers ( [Cohen 87]). We diverge from 
her approach to connectives OIl fundamental issues. Cohen classifies connectives only on their structural properties -
whether they indicaIe al*"eln/child or sibling relation. This approach is, however, insufficient to distinguish between 
the many connectives available in natural languages - 'but' and 'although' share the same structural properties (they 
indicate a parenr/child relation) and are put of the same group of contrastive connectives in the classification used In 
(Cohen 84]. Such a limitation comes from the exclusive consideration of content in the structure built Cohen define", 
the relation of evidence (or 'being an argument for') as a reiatioo between logical propositions (a logical implication, 
In contrast, we view the same relation as a relation between sentences - that is between linguistic entities carryln!o! 
much more infonnation than a propositional contenL 
'But the locuton can be the sane. ThiJ device IiloWl w to a.ccoml for the potllbility eX a sinJle speaker aprellina differmt polnu of view. 
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[Grosz & Sidner 86] propose a general approach to discourse struCUll'e. They view discourse struCUll'e as the 
combination of three components: a linguistic structure. an altentional (or focusing) structure. and an intentional 
structure. The lin~ structure they use is actually a segmentation of a text. Similarly to Cohen' s approach. 
connectives within thiJ tbe<xy are perceived as struCUll'e markers: connectives (and other surface markers) mark 
segment boundaries. They propose to classify connectives according to the change they mark on the other components 
of the discourse structure - attentional and intentional. This approach is therefore richer than Cohen's classification. 
since it does not take content as the only input for building the discourse structure. Their classiflcation of clue phrases is 
limited, however. to indicating whether a clue phrase marks a 'push' or a 'pop' in the focus stack associated with the 
discourse. Furthermore. at this point, they do not show what the definition of a clue word would be. Thus. more work 
needs to be done in this theory before it can be evaluated. 
Using a similar framework for the description of connectives. [Hirschbecg & Litman 87] claim that connectives can 
have two interpretations: cue and non-cue. A cue interpretation indicates a transition in the discourse structure. whereas 
a non cue intezpretation modifies the truth conditions of the sentence. They study the way intonation can be used to 
discriminate between cue and non-cue usage of 'now'. But in our view separate definitions are not needed. The same 
description of 'but' can capture both non-cue (as in examples (1), (2) and (3» and cue usages (as in examples (4) and 
(5». 
8. Conclusion and Future work. 
In our study of what makes a sequence of two turns coherent, we found that the connection between turns is 
actually a relation between two intezpreta1ioos of propositions and not between the propositions themselves. Our use of 
interpretative formats captures relevant pragmatic features of consecutive turns as identified in our analysis. Ultimately. 
this representation will allow the selection of a coherent connector by a language generator. 
Our representation plays a role in the larger theoretical framework presented in [Ducrot 83]. Following Ducrot, the 
semantics of connectives is not limited to the determ.i.nation of truth-<:onditions of sentences. In particular. we adopt the 
use of argwnentative orientations and topoi as part of our interpreWive fermat. We found. however, that these 
pragmatic features were DOt adequate to explain the examples we stlJdjed In addition, we use the notion of the 
functional status of a tum [Roulet tt al8S] and add a new feature. theme. along with a thematization procedure. Such a 
procedure is essential if a language ~ is to lX'Oduce connectives thallink nuns through implicit themes. 
In sum. our fepielDlllIIion synthesizes the theoretical work of Ducrot and RoWet, formalizes it so that it can be used 
computationally aDd e.xIeDdI it by adding a thematiz.a.tion procedure. Our analysis and formalism provides the 
groundwork neces.y for implementadoo of a generator to produce connectives and thal is our current focus. 
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